This article summarizes both the history and the historiography of eugenics across the world and that indicates new lines of inquiry that have evolved in recent years. It demonstrates that eugenics rapidly has become a shared language and ambition in cultures and locations that were otherwise radically different. It discusses the complicated relationship between the unconditional advocacy of contraception by neoMalthusians and the cautious ambivalence typical of eugenicists. This article extends the analysis of eugenics through gender by addressing the question of masculinity and the subjectivity of eugenic advocates. This article analyzes the transnational themes in eugenics and surveys the important question of place-based differences in eugenic aims, methods, policies, and outcome. Eugenics invokes a modern political history in which individuals have been subsumed within collectives and their perceived interests and soon became a signal for, and almost a symbol of, modernization.
The second object is the improvement of the race by furthering the productivity of the Fit by early marriages and healthful rearing of their children. Natural selection rests upon excessive production and wholesale destruction; Eugenics on bringing no more individuals into the world than can be properly cared for, and those only of the best stock.
As this consideration of "excessive production" shows, Galton and Darwin were heavily reliant on Thomas Malthus's ideas about human population numbers. But if Darwin wrote of "man and nature" as they existed-as they were-then Galton wrote of "man and nature" as they might be, even as they should be, through active human intervention on a qualitative basis. The difference between Darwin's description and Galton's prescription was what, in essence, made eugenics political.
Galton understood eugenics to be the rational planning of, and intervention into, human breeding, the application of "selection" to humans based on statistical probability and on an understanding of the mechanisms of heredity. In practice, this materialized both as individuals managing their own reproduction and as state and expert interventions into people's reproductive lives and choices. When in 1904 he wrote that eugenics was a field devoted to "the study of agencies under social control that may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations, either physically or mentally," he expressed the twin sides of the eugenic coin: efforts to improve the fertility of some (positive eugenics) while curbing the fertility of others (negative eugenics), depending on which population and which socio-biological problem was being addressed. Many of the essays in this volume show how both "improvement" and "impairment" projects were simultaneously present in most eugenic movements, another reflection of the duality that characterizes both eugenics and its politico-cultural counterpart, modernity. Not surprisingly, marriage and reproductive activity were invariably central issues. But as John Waller has persuasively argued, the tendency to equate eugenics with Galton is an oversimplification. There is without doubt a longer nineteenth-century history of concern with hereditary disease and of plans to manage marriage for the common good.
Statisticians before Galton were motivated to compute the damage done by unfit marriages, suggesting that Galton's timing was ripe. Attempts by the experimental community founded in Oneida, New York, in 1848 to create ideal reproductive unions in a fully controlled way represents an early conflation of social and reproductive utopianism that predates Galtonian eugenics. Not a few regimes over the twentieth century sought similar reproductive control in far more complex and larger societies. Their leaders could only dream of the total submission to the larger good which the Oneida women professed:
"We do not belong to ourselves in any respect…we have no rights or personal feelings in regard to child-bearing…we will, if necessary, become martyrs to science."
Most women, however, needed rather more persuasion, and eugenics frequently interacted with the welfare structures emerging in the modern nation state. Advocates sought the promotion of marriage and the reproduction of individuals and families (p. 6) deemed desirable and fit through state-based financial incentives and endowments. In early-twentieth-century America, the psychologist Leta S. Hollingsworth (1886 Hollingsworth ( -1939 explicitly named "adequate compensation" as an "effective social device" that would encourage good child-bearing. Galton envisioned a society in which the state aided the well-born in expanding their families, and in National Socialist Germany, among other states, such state aid materialized rapidly.
In many contexts there was strong support for marriage counseling and the physical and mental screening of intending couples before marriage. In some jurisdictions, legislation prevented the marriage of individuals with certain traits; the 1926 Soviet Civic Code, for example, prohibited marriages between mentally ill parties (see the chapter by Krementsov). Though it failed in more jurisdictions than it succeeded, there were numerous attempts by eugenic associations to make marriage screening compulsory, aiming to restrict the reproduction of those with conditions and diseases considered heritable: syphilis, leprosy, tuberculosis, epilepsy, alcoholism, and less specific conditions such as "criminality" or sexual "tendencies." Galton himself, as Paul and Moore point out in this volume, warned that the day would come when those who reproduced irresponsibly would be considered "enemies to the State."
Eugenics and racism have become almost interchangeable terms, but the association is perhaps too simplistic. Historical work on eugenics shows that much, if not most, eugenic intervention was directed at "degenerates" who already "belonged," racially or ethnically: "internal threats" or "the enemy within," whose continued presence diluted the race. In the Third Reich, the prime target for sterilization and euthanasia was the Subscriber: null; date: 09 March 2016 disabled or "feebleminded" German, rather than the foreigner. For Australian lawmakers, it was the English insane who were to be excluded, through immigration restriction statutes and their eugenic clauses. In twentieth-century South Africa, as Saul Dubow shows, eugenics was often a battle over whiteness. In some American states, sterilization of whites was a critical procedure, a means of stabilizing respectable visions of whiteness in a changing demographic environment. To be sure, these were projects of racial nationalism and indeed racial purity-eugenics was never not about race-but the objects of intervention, the subjects understood to be "polluting," were often not racial outsiders, but marginalized insiders whose very existence threatened national and class ideals. This was as much the case in emergent states such as Cuba, as Patience Schell's chapter shows, as in nations with a longer history.
Although eugenics was sometimes applied with rural, peasant, and indigenous populations in mind, more often it concerned the urban "problem populations" of industrialization. In Britain, in particular, eugenics addressed the class issues that had come to dominate domestic British thinking. The urban poor, already regarded as a tenacious problem population, became the focus of a wide range of research. Solutions to the problem of poverty were, in essence, twentieth-century scientific extensions of nineteenth-century social and legislative reform on "pauperism," in which scientific "proofs" of weakness and inferiority bolstered existing moral condemnation. While the massed and urban poor were the main eugenic "problem (p. 7) population" in Britain, the presence of the empire ensured that racial concerns were never wholly muted.
Indeed, Dan Stone has argued that race and class were inseparable in the writings of British eugenics advocates. His emphasis on "ethnic exclusivity" is an important corrective to the more common view of British eugenics as driven predominantly by class prejudices.
Wendy Kline shows in this volume that it was poor rural whites, southern European immigrants, and African Americans only a generation or two from slavery who were considered "problem populations" in Progressive Era America. And when eugenicists turned to the postwar global problem of the "Third World," they imagined a globalized pauper class whose advance demanded intervention, action, and expertise. As Susanne Klausen and Alison Bashford's chapter suggests, it was this interest in managing and intervening in the reproductive lives of one particular social group-the poor-that most directly linked neo-Malthusians and eugenicists.
In places as different as the United States, colonized areas of Africa, and Germany, "undesirable" marriage was also understood in racial terms, and anti-miscegenation laws were increasingly driven by eugenic rationales. As Dan Stone and Dirk Moses point out in this volume, anxieties about interracial marriage were frequently linked to colonial rule. Fears over racial mixing reached their nadir in apartheid South Africa, but as Saul Dubow's chapter shows, apartheid was the endpoint of several generations of work, much of it eugenic and scientific, on the perceived problems of race-mixing. Nonetheless, the presence of apartheid politics was not a necessary precondition for hostility to racemixing. Hans Pols's chapter discusses the race-crossing research undertaken by Ernst Rodenwaldt in the Dutch East Indies, which he took back to Nazi Germany in 1934. And in Australia, scientific policy-makers closely considered the "half-caste problem," implementing a process of biological and cultural assimilation influenced by eugenic ideas. "Half-caste" children were removed from their indigenous families into institutions and then into white communities, with the ultimate aim of "breeding out the colour," as it was often put. Even in non-colonial national contexts with a high degree of social homogeneity, racial "insiders" could become "outsiders" in eugenic initiatives. Véronique Mottier discusses the extensive program of child removal in Switzerland, and Mattias Tydén, the eugenic work of Swedish researchers on the northern Sami minority.
Concerns with population encompassed not only an interest in improving and revitalizing populations to inhabit a modern world, but also the obvious, if sinister, corollary that some populations would be unfit to do so. The prospect of extinction-made so much Among the best-known and more radical manifestations of eugenics was the segregation and sterilization of those deemed "defective" to ensure that they did not pass on their defects to the next generation. As Thomson shows, eugenics was closely linked to a much longer history of institutionalization, in particular the proliferation of asylums from the nineteenth century. It was the institutionalized who were most subject to the proliferating practice of sterilization. Conversely, sterilization was commonly understood to be an advantageous and economically efficient alternative to segregation, minimizing the need for, and the longer-term costs of, the latter. Sterilization was fairly widespread by the 1930s, permitted by legislation in many U.S. and Canadian states and provinces, in the Swiss canton of Vaud, in Scandinavian countries, in Germany, Japan, and Veracruz (Mexico), as well as in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Turkey, Latvia, and Cuba. In some places-Russia being a good example-eugenic advocates were nonetheless hostile to the principle of sterilization.
At its most radical, eugenics manifested as both passive withholding of treatment from, and active killing of, disabled people. The German Darwinist Ernst Haeckel had advocated eugenic euthanasia as early as 1868, and in liberal Britain the eugenicist Dr. Robert Rentoul was euthanasia's best-known proponent. Such a practice was undertaken privately by physicians on newborns, probably everywhere, but very publicly in the United States in the early twentieth century when Dr. Harry Haiselden withheld treatment for deformed newborns in Chicago and actively promoted this eugenic practice as in the interest of the infant, the family, and society. Active any individual both received, and potentially passed on, flawed and/or beneficial attributes. One of the commonest images in eugenic publications was the family tree, the "pedigree chart," which tracked the history of talented families, defective families, Biometrika. The actuarial aspect of this work was not lost on life insurance companies, who regularly drew on eugenics research. Conversely, the data held by life insurance companies-about probability of illness and death within families-was of considerable value to eugenic researchers.
If eugenics was about the problems of inheriting the past, it was also about the optimistic possibilities of planning future generations. There was a power in eugenic promiseperfectibility, improvement, the benefits that would accrue from rational planning.
Despite the persistence of a degenerationist discourse, eugenics was thus marked by considerable optimism: it was an active creed, an applied science. The first pedigrees Galton composed were not of epileptic families, but of the Wedgwood-Darwin-Galton family to which he himself belonged; these studies traced the inheritance of ability.
Meliorist terms such as "race betterment" and "race improvement" were titles commonly chosen by and for eugenic associations, especially those with a greater lay and community membership. Eugenics was premised on a belief that science was of necessity reformist in its intentions and aspirations. Thus Cyrus Schayegh notes in his chapter that Reza Shah's modernist plans for a new Iran focused attention on sociocultural reforms effected through bio-medicine. In Soviet Russia, eugenics focused far more on helping and improving the "fit" rather than (p. 11) worrying about the effects of leaving the "unfit" to their own devices. And as Nikolai Krementsov's chapter shows, this unusual emphasis also offered an outlet for an acceptance of some forms of mental illness (what Russian scientists dubbed "pathography"), which linked creativity and mental instability.
From family planning to national planning, eugenics often appeared beneficial for future populations.
When Was Eugenics? Modernity and the Nation State
Eugenics as a distinct theory emerged in the 1880s, thrived in the years before and after World War I, came under considerable scientific criticism in the 1930s, and suffered more disabling political criticism after World War II. But as Bashford's epilogue indicates, eugenics continued in various forms as part of the scientific and social development of later-twentieth-century genetics and reproductive technologies.
Writers in the early twentieth century often drew a long genealogy for eugenic ideas and practice, writing about ancient traditions of the withdrawal of aid to weakly children and adults. Eugenics thus gained authority by creating a classical lineage for itself. But modern eugenics was also understood by its advocates to be especially humanitarian compared to the ancients. Galton was insistent that the whole point of eugenics was to substitute "humane" methods for both inhumane practices such as infanticide and for the cruelties, as he saw it, inherent in natural selection. Scholars, too, have located eugenics firmly as an expression and a manifestation of modernity. Frank Dikötter suggests that "Eugenics was not so much a clear set of scientific principles as a 'modern' way of talking about social problems in biologizing terms." What, then, was it in the modern period that was so productive of, and receptive to, eugenic practices and eugenic ideas?
Over the nineteenth century the idea of the state, as well as its practices, underwent massive change. Populations-people and their bodies-increasingly became the business of government, to be improved physically and morally. Statistics-originally the "science of the state"-was brought into the fold of biology in new ways, extending long-standing government interest in "vital statistics." Nineteenth-century governments had become centrally concerned with the size of their populations, and statistics provided them with myriad lifestyle and census-style data.
Though the measures recognizable under the eugenic banner were not always stateinitiated, one of the more striking aspects of eugenics is that its presuppositions and Sarah Hodges's chapter on Indian eugenics both demonstrate how population planning could transfer easily from colonial to independent national regimes.
In the early to mid-twentieth century, scientifically authorized projects of race and racial purity were mapped onto this extensive new nation-building. Homogeneity (homo-geneof the same kind) was characteristically privileged over heterogeneity and became a signature element for the imagining and, in many cases, the establishment of new "racial" nations. Australia is a good example of an early-twentieth-century "racial" nation, where eugenic language took considerable hold, as Garton's chapter demonstrates. In many arenas, blood type determined belonging to territory and nation, as Bucur explains for eastern Europe. Likewise, Robertson's chapter (p. 13) demonstrates how profoundly the idea of blood purity was "an organizing metaphor" for deciding exactly who was Japanese. Some Zionists, as Raphael Falk's chapter shows, used blood as a claim for a Jewish homeland. Before chromosome-based technologies, blood typing was paramount in technical attempts to classify, include, and exclude groups of people. This new science of blood typing had strong links to older notions of blood as a distinguishing characteristic, whether distinguishing on the basis of class, race, or other sorts of classification. In these ways, eugenics was central to the modern project of racial nationalism and national rejuvenation.
In the turbulent years of the early twentieth century, eugenics offered particular technologies that might be taken up by states, as nations were built and rebuilt, generated and regenerated by scientists, statesmen, and political and economic planners. Véronique Mottier explores the very different kinds of states in which eugenics was able to flourish: liberal, totalitarian, social democratic, socialist. Despite the popular link drawn constantly between eugenics and the Nazi regime, there was probably as strong a connection between eugenics and the left, and to progressive and reform politics. The optimism of eugenics, and its aspiration to apply scientific ideas actively, was among the reasons it so frequently attracted progressives and liberals.
Thus, in each of these kinds of modern states-even liberal states-eugenic discourse encouraged hygienic practices for the perceived larger good. As Amir Weiner has succinctly put it: "No longer were self-improvement and perfection the pursuit of the selected few, mainly religious orders…In the modern state, each and every individual counted." Citizens and subjects were to streamline themselves, their families, and their bodies for their new modern state. What Ayça Alemdaroğlu argues of modernizing Turkey is more widely applicable: "Imagining…society as a national organic unity prioritized the duties of citizens over their rights." As we have seen, it was typically the powerless and disenfranchised who were rendered problematic and who were likeliest to experience the effects of eugenic philosophy and practice-rural populations, women, non-white people, have been subsumed within collectives and their perceived interests. Eugenic advocates typically had population-level aims firmly in sight, and were concerned less with making individuals happier, healthier, or fitter for their own sake (although for many, this was a perfectly desirable side effect) than with making a significant difference to the physical constitution of future generations. Yet the materialization of the population-level change necessarily entailed intervention into individual lives, mostly though not exclusively managed or promoted by the modern or modernizing state, whether directly or indirectly.
On the other hand, eugenics remains an important part of the history of the modern subject, especially the modern liberal subject whose emerging individual rights-to reproduction, to health, to bodily integrity-were not infrequently asserted and argued in legal cases specifically about eugenic practice, sometimes (p. 14) successfully, sometimes not. The history of eugenic sterilization in particular is a key component of the development of a discourse of "rights" in which reproduction has, in many countries, come to be comprehended. Similar issues arose around the legal concept of consent when Nazi experimentation (including sterilization) was assessed in the postwar Nuremberg trials, as Weindling discusses in this volume.
Eugenics, then, arose out of a constellation of recognizably modern issues, but it soon became a signal for, and almost a symbol of, modernization. States keen to display a commitment to modern planning implemented hygiene and public health measures. Nation-states-China, Japan, and in eastern Europe-and the professionals and experts supporting them, whose reputations depended on their being seen as modernizing, took up eugenics enthusiastically. The modern state's increasing interest and involvement in health practices served as an incentive for doctors to encourage eugenic practices that would increase their status as well as the resources allocated to their work. As many of the chapters that follow reveal, doctors and other medical professionals were often central supporters and advocates of eugenic practices from disease notification to public health campaigns aimed at expanding public understanding of hereditary diseases. For sociologists and political philosophers, then, as well as for historians of science, education, social policy, and culture, eugenics emerged out of, and came to stand for, modernity. It has done so in large part because of the strong popular and scholarly connection drawn even now between eugenics, German National Socialism, and the Holocaust. Our volume shows, however, that the link between modernity and eugenics was about period as much as place; it is less the Nazi version of eugenics than the familiarity of those practices across so many nations and cultures that is the truly astounding element in the history of eugenics. 
Where Was Eugenics? Local and Global Geographies
This book is structured by two aspects of the question of eugenics and place. On the one hand, we recognize the phenomenal transnational uptake of eugenic ideas more or less simultaneously across many parts of the world. Part I analyzes these transnational themes in eugenics. Part II surveys the important question of place-based differences in eugenic aims, methods, policies, and outcome. The geography of eugenics was national in the first instance. But regional and, in some instances, interregional, cultural-scientific alliances were increasingly significant. Broad differences between environmental and biological approaches in different contexts are suggested by the terms used for eugenics. Some national cultures used the word "eugenics," derived from eu (well or good) and genus (born). Other national policy and science groups preferred terms deriving from a root meaning "to cultivate" or "to care for," rather than "to be born": puériculture was often used in Francophone contexts, where the term came to mean infant or child health, or methods of rearing and training children. The more generic "homiculture" was also widely used in place of eugenics in Latin America. With a sense of active tilling and tending, homiculture, puériculture, and viriculture-broadly consistent with Lamarckian approaches to heredity-held a more social meaning than the biologically oriented "eugenics." Indeed, Galton had early considered "viriculture" as a possible term for his new science. Even earlier, the strange term "stirpiculture" was used to signal the breeding of special stocks, or family lines, with respect to humans. In the late 1840s the leader of the utopian Oneida community in New York, John Humphrey Noyes (1811-1886) used "stirpiculture" to describe his plans and activities for "intelligent, well-ordered procreation," claiming that "scientific combination will be applied to human generation as freely and successfully as it is to that of other animals." This was a plan he and his community put systematically into practice between 1865 and 1878. In this instance, the term "stirp"-broadly meaning a line of descent from a single ancestor, or primary bearer of heredity, and used briefly by Galton-was as significant as the term "culture."
Hygiene was another important term linked to place in the history of eugenics. As Turda's chapter shows, Rassenhygiene was deployed first by the German biologist Alfred Ploetz (1860-1940) in 1895, and the term was picked up in Anglophone settings: the Racial Hygiene Association of New South Wales, for example, was an Australian eugenicfeminist organization, which retained its title until 1960. In English-speaking contexts, race was a slippery concept, sometimes meaning "white people," sometimes "Englishspeaking peoples of the world," but also sometimes "human species." In India, Hodges tells us, "race" and "nation" were terms used largely interchangeably. By the late 1930s, especially during and after World War II, "racial hygiene" came to signal German eugenics specifically, and English eugenicists typically distanced themselves from such associations.
Although eugenic aspirations and ambitions were remarkably common, shared, and agreed across the globe, the methods by which they were realized were often distinct points of difference and comparison. Because eugenics dealt with life and death, the stakes were high and organized religions were involved at both doctrinal and institutional levels, shaping one of the major geographical axes of difference in the history of eugenics. Many of the chapters discuss the significant gap between Protestant-and Catholic-dominated contexts. Catholic opposition was not always directed to eugenics per se, but rather to the specific practices that rendered sex non-reproductive and thus ran up against Catholic doctrine on the sanctity of life and the function of heterosexual marriage: sterilization especially but also contraception. As the chapters by Mottier, Act.
Yet the difference between "voluntary" and "coerced" was oftentimes difficult to discern. As Natalia Gerodetti has argued, "the absence or existence of a legislative basis for sterilization is in itself not much of an indicator for its practice…The absence of regulation, furthermore, potentially leaves practices in the hands of gate keepers or institutional policies." Historians know that sterilizations took place in institutions irrespective of legal indications at least until the late twentieth century. Yolanda Eraso, for example, has demonstrated the extent to which biological sterilizations took place in Catholic Argentina for eugenic reasons in the 1930s, despite its clear illegality according to the Penal Code, and despite Catholic opposition. Nonetheless, the question of consent was central for eugenicists, as they developed and argued their cases, and for clinicians who sought to avoid regulation.
Critics of Eugenics
The successful implementation of actual eugenic practice was sometimes quite limited, or at least not as extensive as the promoters of eugenics hoped. In practice, eugenics was hobbled almost everywhere it emerged, sometimes by outspoken and organized religious opposition, sometimes by skeptical scientists, sometimes by individuals who refused to Jennings did signal, however, the as-yet theoretical possibilities of diagnostics: "negative eugenic measures would be made more effective by the discovery of a method of detecting normal carriers of defective genes: but this cannot now be done." Here Jennings anticipated the enormous change that took place after prenatal diagnosis and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis of embryos became possible, developments that Bashford discusses in the epilogue.
Geneticists, then, were particularly critical of the sterilization programs that by the 1920s and 1930s were favored in many countries. But eugenics was also frequently opposed by scientists on political as well as scientific grounds. Having put forward his critique of the efficacy of sterilization, Herbert Jennings pointed out the non-scientific character of much eugenics: "National and racial prejudices have entered largely into eugenic propaganda.
One of the commonest objectives has been the maintenance of the purity or the dominance of a certain racial or national group-the group selected for preferences being that to which the selectors belong." While Nazi Germany is always foremost in modern critiques of eugenics, earlier German expressions prompted considerable opposition as well. The British writer G. K. Chesterton (1874 Chesterton ( -1936 in China, thought the application of animal breeding techniques to humans a dubious science, and he was openly critical of Chinese eugenics (see the chapter by Chung).
Criticism of eugenics sharpened in and over the postwar assessment and trials of Nazi officials. The so-called Doctors' Trials focused attention on the "euthanasia" program, the sterilization experiments, and genetic-oriented twin experiments. As Bashford discusses in the epilogue, the connection between eugenics, sterilization, (p. 20) and Nazi genocidal policies and practices were drawn especially strongly from the 1970s, when disability, feminist, and anti-racist activists and scholars questioned ongoing discriminatory practice in health and reproductive domains, including sterilization. Details of the Tuskegee syphilis experiment begun in the United States in the 1930s, in which treatment was withheld from African American men in the Alabama county of Macon, were widely disseminated from 1972 and crystallized public conversation about race and medical ethics. This was a period of strongly left-oriented intellectual critique of science, the apogee of postwar anti-science, and anti-psychiatry in particular, leading to a generation of individuals who began to seek compensation for past state practices-for eugenic sterilization, for compulsory confinement, for experimental medical practice. This all coincided with and was driven by a wave of new scholarship on the history of eugenics, and by literature on eugenics in almost every genre, from memoir to novel to psychiatrist Peter R. Breggin's piece, "The Psychiatric Holocaust," in a 1979 issue of Penthouse.
Conclusion
Mark Adams laid the groundwork for our study two decades ago, in his important comparative collection on Germany, France, Brazil, and Russia. This new collection extends and deepens his important insistence on a comparative approach to the history of eugenics. The chapters that follow survey the global contours of this history, as both a transnational phenomenon of the modern period where particular themes are recognizable in otherwise vastly different locations, and as place-bound histories of colonies, nations, and regions.
The popularity and persistence of what detractors have often called a pseudoscience across such a remarkable variety of political, cultural, and scientific boundaries is itself a phenomenon that demands attention. What made eugenics so attractive, so powerful a pull for policy-makers in the early decades of the twentieth century, and in such different locations? Wherever we look, and whatever other differences marked its emergence, 53 54 55 
